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Violent political conflict is often assumed to be caused 
by ethnicised politics, while ethnicised politics, in turn, 
is thought to be caused by discrimination or elite rivalry 
(or both).1 The argument goes that social and political 
discrimination along ethnic cleavages or struggles over 
national resources along ethnic cleavages organised by elites 
contribute to the salience of ethnicity in politics, which is 
widely acknowledged to increase the propensity of further 
(violent) ethnic conflicts (Hechter 2004; Snyder 2000; Gurr 
2002, 1993; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 1997; Brass 1985; Hech-
ter 1999; Horowitz 1985; Kandeh 1992; Ali and Matthews 
1999). Simply speaking about ethnic cleavages implies that 
ethnicity not only structures the society, but has been sub-
ject to coherent and organised political expression (Kriesi 
1998, 167), i.e. has been politicised. In short, ethnicised poli-
tics – widely assumed to entail ethnic conflict – are seen to 
be induced by exclusion inherent to the structure (i.e. actors 
or institutions) of the political system.2
In a departure from these common approaches, my line 
of reasoning highlights the importance of conceptualising 
ethnicised politics as patterns interpreting exclusion with 
reference to ethnic categories. In doing so, it follows analyses 
which focus on the symbolic and semantic dimensions of 
“ethnicisation of politics” (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 
2007). Understanding ethnicised politics as a pattern of 
interpretation places emphasis on what “those living in 
that world” (Schütz 1972, 9) take for granted and real. This 
The article is based on lines of reasoning developed 
and interviews conducted within the scope of a 
PhD project entitled “The Dilemma of Recogni-
tion: On the ‘Experienced Reality’ of Ethnicised 
Politics of Rwandans and Burundians.”
1 The contributions to this discussion are di-
versely labelled, either as “politicisation of 
ethnicity” (Kandeh 1992; Wimmer 2002) or 
“ethnic politics” (Chazan 1982; Chazan, Lewis, 
Rothchild, Stedman, and Mortimer 1999). 
2 Basically, structure is understood as pattern or arrange-
ment as opposed to randomness or chaos. Such patterns 
are predominantly thought of as being constituted either 
by social relations between agents (i.e. by agency itself) 
or by institutional structures that are external to the 
agents (López and Scott 2009). These structures (thought 
of as either being created by agency or being external to 
agency) are often held to be external to a specific histori-
cal context. On the contrary, it is crucial to my argument 
that specific patterns of interpretation that are induced 
by a specific historical context are taken into account.
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is what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991) call 
knowledge, which is seen to constitute social reality (1991, 
15). This knowledge is produced by historical processes that 
are, consequently, relevant for understanding the knowl-
edge (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 72). Accordingly, any 
analysis of institutional order has to take the knowledge of 
its members into account (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 82). 
Following Pierre Bourdieu, I work with the coexisting, and 
sometimes directly competing, supra-individual points of 
views reflecting social divisions in society (Bourdieu 1999, 
125). In other words, the study reveals diverging, even, 
contradictory realities. Illustrating how Rwandans and Bu-
rundians conceive their realities, i.e. how they take notions 
for granted, required qualitative interviews: I conducted 
semi-standardised interviews with twenty-two Rwandans 
and twenty Burundians between September 2007 and May 
2008. The focus on taken-for-granted notions and, hence, 
(diverging) social realities has clear implications for my 
understanding of the interview material. I take my inter-
view material as “a form to talk – a ‘discourse’, ‘account’ or 
‘repertoire’ – which represents a culturally available way of 
packaging experience” (Kitzinger 2004, cited in Silverman 
2006, 129, emphasis added). The interview material is not 
assumed to give answers to questions concerning facts and 
events. Rather, the material is understood as a representa-
tion or account of the experiences of the interviewee (Silver-
man 2006, 117). 
But why is it that ethnicised politics, i.e. political and social 
exclusion along ethnic cleavages, is seen as particularly 
political and conflict-prone?3 In modern nation states, it 
is taken for granted that social political and legal closure, 
i.e. exclusion and inclusion, is structured by the modern 
nation state (Wimmer 2002, 57; Bös 1993). Nation states are 
themselves ethnic (Bös 2008, 69).4 Legitimate rule as it is 
taken-for-granted in the modern nation state is “rule by our 
people, that is, rule by people who are like us, people of our 
nationality” (Ringmar 1998, 534, emphasis added). Being 
part of an ethnic category (i.e. having a certain ethnic affili-
ation) entitles to (political, social and legal) rights (Wimmer 
2002, 1). In this sense, inclusion (and, hence, exclusion) is 
structured along ethnic categories.
Given that nation states are ethnic, ethnic categories that do 
not coincide with the nation state necessarily involve exclu-
sion. In other words, ethnic categories are symbolically 
unequal and thus imply exclusion (Sutterlüty 2006). Conse-
quently, social and political exclusion interpreted in terms 
of ethnic categories is especially exclusive since it does not 
correspond to the taken-for-granted, i.e. legitimate form of 
exclusion structured along ethnic categories coinciding with 
the nation state. So exclusion interpreted in terms of ethnic 
categories (i.e. ethnicised politics) challenges the legitimate 
modern form of political organisation and representation (i.e. 
nation state) and, in this sense, is political and conflict prone.
To study ethnicised politics as patterns of interpretation, the 
present study looks at Rwanda and Burundi. In both coun-
tries, political institutional models have been introduced to 
end a very violent political history. In Burundi the constitu-
tion introduced in 2005 provides ethnic quotas of Tutsi and 
Hutu in all governmental and administrational institutions 
(usually 40:60) and in the army (50:50). By contrast, after 
the military victory of the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwanda-
is) in 1994, Rwanda decided to avoid ethnic representation 
in political institutions.5 Yet the two countries are similar 
in many aspects: The ethnic categories, and numerous 
relationships attributed to these categories, are comparable. 
3 This discussion analysing ethnicity in politics, 
which is said to lead to instable democracy and “eth-
nic political conflict” (Rabushka and Shepsle 1971, 
461), refers mostly to non-Western, post-imperial 
societies still in the process of nation-state-building 
(Wimmer 1997) and democratisation (Snyder 2000). 
Correspondingly, I focus on societies in which the 
political history (including large-scale massacres) 
is ethnicised in the sense that it is interpreted with 
heavy reference to ethnic categories. Of course, in 
general poverty, economic underdevelopment and 
lack of democracy (e.g. political and civil rights, 
mechanisms for peaceful adjudication of dis-
putes) (Sambanis 2001, 266--7) play a major role in 
fostering further violent ethnic conflict. All these 
criteria have to be taken into account in order to 
assess the propensity of violent ethnic conflict.
4 Of course, nation states follow different ideas 
about in- and exclusion and apply different prac-
tises to organise in- and exclusion (Thomas 2002). 
Usually, the academic discussion distinguishes 
between ethnic and political conceptions (Kohn 
1944; Eley and Suny 1996; Thomas 2002; Smith 
2003). Moreover, ethnic boundary markers are 
socially contested. Accordingly, ethnic boundaries 
can be challenged, changed and become mean-
ingless (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004, 35).
5 New constitutions were approved in 2003 in 
Rwanda and in 2005 in Burundi, with elections 
held later the same year in each case. Burundi’s 
transitional constitution of 2003 also featured ethnic 
quotas. In Rwanda ethnic quotas were abandoned 
in 1994 after the FPR seized political power.
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Both are composed of 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi 
and 1 percent Twa.6 In both countries, these categories are 
referred to as “Hutu” and “Tutsi”. In post-independence 
political history, the ethnic cleavages have played a major 
role in very violent conflicts as well as in their interpreta-
tion. The current political systems in Rwanda and Burundi 
both aim at overcoming ethnicised politics. The Burundian 
Constitution prohibits the exclusion of any Burundian due 
to his ethnic affiliation (Article 13, Burundian Constitution) 
while the Rwandan Constitution states that all Rwandans 
are “free and equal in rights and duties”, which includes 
the non-discrimination of Rwandans on the basis of their 
ethnic origin (Article 11, Rwandan Constitution).
By means of qualitative interviews, the present analysis 
aims to construct an ethnic interpretation of political power 
in the political institutional models of Rwanda and Burun-
di. The analysis of the interviews looks at similar ethnicised 
patterns of interpretation by Rwandans and Burundians 
describing opposing institutional models. I focus on as-
sessments about who is in power and, hence, which “ethnic 
group” exactly is excluded, which follow contradictory 
(ethnicised) lines in each country.7
These conflicting assessments of the same political institu-
tional system and even more the occurrence of ethnicised 
patterns of interpretation concerning totally opposed 
systems (both designed to overcome ethnicised politics) 
point to the necessity of rethinking ethnicised politics and, 
accordingly, the prevention of ethnic conflict. This line 
of reasoning suggests taking into account the knowledge 
of members of the institutional order in order to discuss 
political and social exclusion and, hence, the prevention of 
ethnic conflict. 
1. Ethnicised Politics within the Context of the Modern Nation State
Whereas many authors regard ethnic conflict as inher-
ently modern (Snyder 2000; Gurr 2002, 1993; Mann 2005), 
implicitly relating it to ideas of democracy and political rep-
resentation of ethnicity, Andreas Wimmer’s understanding 
(2002; 1997) is special in that he explicitly takes the notion of 
the modern nation state and the resulting ideas of legitimate 
in- and exclusion into account. The idea of nation state is 
relevant for ethnic conflict since: “the formation of the na-
tion state and the rise of nationalism and ethnicity are the 
products of the fundamental reorganisation of the main 
modes of inclusion and exclusion, of a reordering of the 
basic principles of membership and identity along national 
and ethnic lines” (Wimmer 2002, 42). 
All legal, political, military and social rights are reserved for 
the citizens of the respective nation state in what Wimmer 
calls “ethno-political closure” (2002, 70). The idea of nation 
state comes with a specific idea of political legitimacy that is 
the rule of those who are both alike and equal. In this sense, 
being part of an ethnic category (i.e. having a certain ethnic 
affiliation) entitles to (political, social and legal) rights 
(Wimmer 2002, 1). To illustrate this point, under current 
U.S. law, exclusively “natural born citizens” are eligible to 
become President, excluding those who have become citi-
zens by naturalisation (Article 2, U.S. Constitution). The law 
reflects how ethnicity (i.e. common descent) is understood 
as a relevant criterion for representing the U.S. political 
community. Even in a nation state which is comparatively 
inclusive in terms of the possibilities for naturalisation, 
these laws clearly reflect the idea of a political community 
defined (amongst other things) by descent. Being part of 
this community defined by ethnicity entitles to rights and, 
hence, structures in- and exclusion.
Given that nation states are ethnic, ethnic categories that 
do not coincide with the nation state must involve exclusion. 
In other words, ethnic categories are symbolically un-
equal and, in this sense, imply exclusion (Sutterlüty 2006). 
Consequently, social and political exclusion interpreted 
in terms of ethnic categories is especially exclusive since 
6 The percentages are based on censuses conducted 
during colonial times (Lemarchand 1994, 6).
7 Following Rogers Brubaker, who pleads against 
“groupism” and reification in research about ethnic-
ity, I avoid speaking about “ethnic groups” since the 
term evokes the idea of “internally homogeneous, 
externally-bounded groups, even unitary collective 
actors with common purposes” (Brubaker 2004, 
8). The same is true for the notions of “the Hutu” 
and “the Tutsi”. By using these terms I intend 
to highlight this very notion of “ethnic groups”, 
“the Tutsi” and “the Hutu”, which are assumed to 
have common purposes and, hence, to be collec-
tive actors. These assumptions have far-reaching 
implications, e.g. that political exclusion necessarily 
implies the social exclusion of an “ethnic group”.
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it does not correspond to the taken-for-granted, i.e. legiti-
mate form of exclusion structured along ethnic categories 
coinciding with the nation state. It questions both ideas, the 
“community of likes” and the “community of equals”, that 
basically constitute the national principles (Wimmer 2002, 
53). So ethnicised politics challenge the legitimate modern 
form of political organisation and representation (i.e. nation 
state) and are, hence, very political and conflict-prone. Put 
differently, unequal distribution of resources, services and 
costs leads to a struggle over “who owns the state” (Wim-
mer 1997)? 
The criteria related to the idea of the modern nation state 
characterised by equality and likeness are “idealizations 
that are rarely, if ever, fully actualized” (Riggs 1998, 272). 
Nonetheless these dimensions bear the potential to generate 
ethnic conflict if they are not fully actualized (Riggs 1998, 
272). I hold that the gap between – as Riggs puts it – the ideal 
and its actualisation creates a potential for political claims 
that are ethnically framed. Ethnicised politics has the poten-
tial to challenge the actual distribution of power and is an 
especially plausible, legitimate and powerful claim. 
Within the predominant academic discussion about ethni-
cised politics two different strands can be broadly distin-
guished. Both build on the finding that ethnicity is particu-
larly salient and relevant within the context of the modern 
nation state either when exclusion (i.e. discrimination) 
occurs along ethnic cleavages or when ethnic cleavages are 
instrumentalised for competition for resources (especially 
by the political elite) – or both. They are closely interrelated 
and both are inherently related to the notions of ethnicity 
and nation state. 
To begin with, the academic discussion often refers to the 
finding that ethnic cleavages are (empirically) important in 
organising competition for resources in the modern nation 
state and to the high conflict potential that is implied (Brass 
1991; Wimmer 2002; Mann 2005; Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, 
Stedman, and Mortimer 1999; Geertz 1973). The nation state 
is discussed as a newly introduced political organisation 
where accumulated and centralised resources are allocated. 
Ethnicity is a form to organise competition for resources 
(Williams 2003, 105), leading to what Susan Olzak calls 
“ethnic mobilization” (1983, 355). Such a focus on the role 
of ethnicity in its mobilising function for political ends has 
been very important in the instrumentalist approach. This 
approach understands the salience of ethnicity as being the 
result of political rivalry (Williams 2003). Here, the role of 
the elite gains particular relevance (Chazan 1999, 112; Brass 
1985; Kandeh 1992; Ali and Matthews 1999). 
The second strand of the discussion about ethnicised 
politics assumes that inequalities between ethnic groups 
and discrimination of ethnic groups foster their politi-
cal relevance (Mann 2005; Chazan 1982; Hechter 1999; 
Horowitz 1985). In this respect, Michael Hechter’s thesis of 
“Internal Colonialism” (1999) is very prominent. Hechter 
starts from unequal development and industrialisation 
within a nation state leading to unequal distribution of 
power and resources between core and the periphery. He 
then goes on to propose that the peripheral group would 
come to regard itself as the superior culture and might 
eventually seek independence. Similarly, Donald Horow-
itz describes the juxtaposition of backward and advanced 
ethnic groups, largely a legacy of colonial policy, as the 
source of many conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean 
(1985, 167). The idea of political and economic oppression of 
ethnic groups causing ethnic conflict is also implied in the 
prominent academic discussion about “greed” and “griev-
ances” (Nathan 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Wimmer, 
Cedermann, and Min 2009). While “greed” alludes to 
the ability to finance wars, “grievances” implies exclu-
sion along ethnic cleavages (Wimmer, Cedermann, and 
Min 2009). Understanding ethnicised politics as patterns 
of interpretation as I do places emphasis on what “those 
living in that world” take for granted and real, i.e. their 
knowledge, which is historically produced. Focusing on the 
historically produced taken-for-granted and self-evident 
notions, i.e. knowledge of “those living in that world” by 
conceiving of ethnicised politics, I come close to Andreas 
Wimmer’s definition of nationalism as the main cultural 
compromise of modern societies (involving the nation state 
as the main social closure) (Wimmer 2002, 52). He under-
stands cultural compromise as acceptance by all actors in 
a communicative arena, a “consensus over the validity of 
norms, classifications and patterns of interpretation that 
lasts beyond the open process of its production” (Wimmer 
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2002, 29). The cultural compromise ultimately depends on 
patterns of interpretation and power positions of strategi-
cally competent individuals. In contrast to Wimmer and 
following Berger and Luckmann, I do not consider the 
strategic aspect as a factor creating specific patterns of 
interpretation. Yet, power positions were crucial for the 
selection of the interviewees because I consider knowledge 
to be influenced by social divisions.8 I understand the 
coexisting, and sometimes directly competing, supra-indi-
vidual points of views to reflect social divisions in society 
(Bourdieu 1999, 125). Accordingly, ethnicised politics are 
conceived as a pattern of interpretation “that lasts beyond 
the open process of its production”. Neglecting the strate-
gic intention of the speaker, ethnicised politics constitute 
an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising 
political ends (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007, 8). In 
the analysis of the interviews I understand the quotes as 
taken-for-granted notions, which constitute social reality. 
Following Berger and Luckmann (1991), I conceive ethni-
cised politics as legitimate, i.e. taken-for-granted, notions, 
according to which ethnic categories make up the basis 
for in- and exclusion. In this sense, notions are legitimate 
where they are taken-for-granted and self-evident (Berger 
and Luckmann 1991, 12).
This focus on taken-for-granted and self-evident notions, 
i.e. conceiving ethnicised politics as patterns interpreting 
exclusion in terms of ethnic categories reconciles, on the 
one hand, the strand conceiving ethnicised politics as a 
strategically deployable instrument in that it accepts it as 
a powerful resource for achieving political ends (without, 
though, considering the stratigical intention of the speaker) 
and the one considering the reality of exclusion as a relevant 
aspect for its understanding.
2.  Two Options, One Intention: Political Institutional 
Systems in Rwanda and Burundi
The declared objective in Rwanda and Burundi is the pro-
motion of peace and development (Vandeginste 2006, 27). 
In order to achieve their respective aims they introduced 
different political institutional models: Whereas Burundi 
opted for a consociationalist model in 2005, the system 
Rwanda introduced in 2003 corresponds to the model 
of majoritarian democracy. In terms of the way they 
deal with ethnic cleavages, I label Rwanda and Burundi 
respectively “denial of” and “power sharing along” ethnic 
cleavages. 
Since its seizure of power by military force the Front Patrio-
tique Rwandais (FPR) has pursued the objective of estab-
lishing a “true democracy” understood as “political majority 
rule based on a genuine program uniting all Rwandans” 
(ICG 2001, 3). The official main aim is the eradication of 
ethnicity from public life (ICG 2001, 3). Rwanda seeks to es-
tablish a Rwandan identity based on a legalistic understand-
ing of citizenship emphasising equal rights (Buckley-Zistel 
2006, 102).
In order to overcome ethnic division and promote national 
unity Rwanda implemented majoritarian, liberal democra-
cy. The model focuses on individuals (as opposed to collec-
tives) as the bearers of rights and accepts the government-
versus-opposition-pattern and winner-takes-all character of 
majority rule. Concerning the concrete institutional imple-
mentation, Rwanda is a presidential parliamentary system 
whose legislature is composed of an elected eighty-member 
Chamber of Deputies and a Senate whose twenty-six 
members are partly elected and partly appointed (Article 76 
and 82, Rwandan Constitution). These political institutions 
involve “censorship and self-censorship” concerning issues 
related to the violent past (Buckley-Zistel 2006, 112), which 
of course strongly implies ethnicity. Discussing ethnicity 
has become a “taboo” (Burnet 2007, 11) enforced by very 
broad definitions of “divisionism” and “genocide ideology” 
that basically cover ethnicity and the history of the genocide 
(HRW 2008, 36). Ethnic identities are officially denied and 
“denying their non-existence involves severe penal sanc-
tions” (Lemarchand 2006b, 7). 
8 In order to capture competing knowledge I 
treated social divisions between “political elite” and 
“citizens” and between being “oppositional” and 
“conforming to the regime in power” as relevant.
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In Burundi the option of resolving the conflict by negotia-
tion emerged because neither party believed it could win 
the conflict by force (Nimubona 2007, 502). The Burun-
dian constitution adopted in 2006 is described as “mark-
edly” and “largely consociational” (Vandeginste 2006, 4; 
Reyntjens 2006, 119) since “classical instruments, such as 
minority over-representation, quota, and minority veto” 
are applied (Reyntjens 2006, 119). The peace negotiations 
that started officially in 1998 were based on ethnicity and 
the representation of ethnicity, as the political parties 
regrouped themselves along ethnic lines (Nimubona 2007, 
497). The Arusha agreement signed in 2000 and the Pretoria 
power-sharing agreement of 2004 produced a draft con-
stitution that was approved by referendum on 28 February 
2005. It takes into consideration the ethnic composition of 
the government, parliament, senate, military and police. 
Ministerial portfolios and places in the national assembly 
are shared 60:40 between Hutu and Tutsi whereas in the 
senate Hutu and Tutsi hold equal numbers of seats. Three 
Batwa are co-opted. Thirty percent of the members of 
government have to be women. In the defence and security 
forces there is parity. The two vice-presidents are a Hutu 
from a predominately Hutu party and a Tutsi from a pre-
dominately Tutsi party. On the local level no more than 67 
percent of mayors may be from one ethnic group (Lemarch-
and 2006a).
So Rwanda pursues a strategy of “denial of” ethnic cleav-
ages while Burundi seeks “power sharing” along them.
3.  Ethnicised Patterns of Interpretation of 
Politics in Rwanda and Burundi
I conducted qualitative semi-standardised interviews with 
twenty-two Rwandans and twenty Burundians between 
September 2007 and May 2008.9 To select interviewees I 
used “selective sampling” designed to include maximum 
variation of cases (Kluge and Kelle 1999, 47, 51), since the 
project primarily seeks competing knowledge, in particular 
with respect to the question “Which ‘ethnic group’ is ex-
cluded?” In order to capture competing knowledge I treated 
social divisions between “political elite” and “citizens” and 
between being “oppositional” and “conforming to the re-
gime in power” as relevant. In making the selection, ethnic 
and regional criteria were used to define citizens as being 
“oppositional” and “conforming to the regime in power”. 
When selecting members of the political elite, party affilia-
tion was taken into account.
I understand ethnicised politics as the interpretation of 
exclusion in terms of ethnic categories. In this sense, politi-
cal power interpreted along ethnic cleavages (implying the 
exclusion of the other “ethnic group”) ethnicises politics. To 
discover how Rwandans and Burundians interpret exclu-
sion in ethnic terms, I developed – following the method of 
content analysis introduced by Philipp Mayring (2000) – 
categories based on the interview material.10 In the follow-
ing I present two of these categories, which exemplify eth-
nicised politics independently of the structures inherent to 
the political institutional models, since the quotes included 
in the categories Ethnic Interpretation of Formal Power and 
Ethnic Interpretation of Informal Power directly refer to 
exclusion implied in the political institutional models.
3.1 Ethnic Interpretation of Formal Power
The category Ethnic Interpretation of Formal Power com-
prises statements that interpret the regime in ethnic terms, 
generally equating the government with an “ethnic group”, 
either Hutu or Tutsi. This likening can be found in state-
ments from citizens of both countries, notwithstanding 
their different institutional models. Despite the ethnic quo-
tas in Burundi, the regime is described as a Hutu regime, 
while the regime in Rwanda is referred to as a Tutsi regime.11
The Rwandan interviewee quoted in the following is a 
genocide survivor who works as a car mechanic in Gisenyi, 
a town in the north of Rwanda. He clearly sees “the Tutsi” 
9 Most of the interviews were conducted, 
recorded and written down in French, and 
translated by the author for the present article.
10 For my PhD project I developed about forty cat-
egories, some of which identify ethnicised politics.
11 Being Hutu or Tutsi was a relevant crite-
rion for selecting interviewees. Yet, as will be 
emphasised later on, the present analysis does 
not aim to analyse whether “the Hutu” or “the 
Tutsi” are oppositional or conform with their 
current governments in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Hence, the ethnic affiliations of the interview-
ees who are quoted are not mentioned.
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in power. In the course of the interview I ask him what he 
understands by an “ethnic group”. He does not directly 
reply to my question and refers to the political system: 
They are there: the one who is Hutu is Hutu. He knows his 
limits and he accepts them. And then the Tutsi, … you have to 
see who is the head of these things …, hence, the main prin-
ciples: who is in power? The Tutsi are in power and the Hutu did 
not accept it. If you are normal, and you see that the other is in 
power, you have to accept it. 
The interviewee equates the present political regime in 
Rwanda with “the Tutsi” who according to him are in 
power. Saying that it is important to see who constitutes 
the head, he is suggesting that there might be some Hutu 
in political positions as well. However, the crucial political 
position(s) (the head) are held by “the Tutsi” so “the Tutsi” 
are in power. To him, it seems self-evident that “the Hutu” 
could not accept that. He describes a strong dichotomy 
between Hutu and Tutsi with respect to political power: 
Either Tutsi or Hutu can be in power. He even refers to 
them as “the other” as if Hutu and Tutsi were two collec-
tive actors struggling for power. Assuming that there might 
even be some (powerless) Hutu in the government, points to 
the ethnic interpretation of informal power discussed in the 
next section.
Burundians also interpret political power distribution and 
exclusion in ethnic terms. In the following, a Burundian 
bashingantahe (a traditional mediating authority) answers 
my question about the most important social cleavages in 
Burundi today. He does not really refer to the question, and 
instead expresses his lack of understanding for the con-
tinuing existence of the FNL-PALIPEHUTU, which was 
still fighting at the time of the interviews in spring 2008:12
I am saying that I do not understand why the FNL is fighting 
against an entirely Hutu government, a quasi-Hutu parliament, 
a quasi-Hutu administration. And PALIPEHUTU, that is a 
movement that aims to liberate the Hutu. I am asking: Are the 
Hutu liberating the Hutu from the Hutu? That is absurd; totally 
absurd. … The rebellion of the Hutu was once directed against 
the Tutsi. … Today the rebellion is directed against the Hutu 
government, a Hutu senate, a Hutu parliament, a Hutu adminis-
tration, … Hutu power.
Speaking of a “Hutu government”, a “Hutu senate” and a 
“Hutu administration” he establishes a strong relationship 
between “ethnic groups” (understood as collective actors 
with common purposes) and political power. In the case 
of Burundi, these patterns of interpretation are even more 
striking since there are clear formal regulations requiring 
all political institutions to be composed of 60 percent Hutu 
and 40 percent Tutsi. Note the interesting juxtaposition 
with the first statement in the next section, which is made 
by a member of the FNL-PALIPEHUTU rebel movement 
that according to the bashingantahe has no “raison d’être”.
Despite the explicit aim of both institutional systems to 
overcome an ethnic interpretation of political power, these 
interpretations persist. The quoted statements establish a 
direct relationship between a regime and an “ethnic group”, 
interpreting the regime in Burundi as a Hutu regime and 
the regime in Rwanda as a Tutsi regime, and conversely 
implying the exclusion of “the Tutsi” and “the Hutu” re-
spectively. If we consider statements that refer to informal 
political power, the interpretations of power distribution, 
exclusion and the question “Which ‘ethnic group’ exactly is 
excluded” become more complex.
3.2 Ethnic Interpretation of Informal Power
Instead of simply equating Hutu and Tutsi with a regime, 
statements included in the category Ethnic Interpretation 
of Informal Power (implicitly) affirm the formal presence 
of Hutu and Tutsi in the political systems but deny the 
relevance of that merely formal presence. The interviewees 
insist that the informal power lies elsewhere (with either 
Hutu or Tutsi). 
The first interviewee is an active member of the rebel move-
ment FNL-PALIPEHUTU. In contrast to the bashinganta-
he, who described the rebel movement as having no “raison 
d’être” since “the Hutu” were now in power in Burundi, 
12 Initially the armed wing of the rebel movement 
PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple 
Hutu) was called “FNL” (Forces Nationales de 
Libération). ).In January 2009, the PALIPEHUTU-
FNL changed its name to FNL (HRW 2010, 1).
265IJCV : Vol. 4 (2) 2010, pp. 257 – 268Schraml: Ethnicised Politics
he interprets the political situation very differently. After I 
have described my research project and the purpose of the 
interviews, he starts talking:13
The CNDD-FDD is infiltrated by the Tutsi. When they could, 
they joined the movement and they still hold the positions in 
the upper echelons of power. The Hutu might drive a big car. 
He is very satisfied that he is the president, but does he really 
have power? The most important positions are held by Tutsi. For 
instance, the Minister of Defence is Tutsi. 
Although referring to the same political system as the 
bashingantahe, which is formally composed of 60 percent 
Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi the FNL-PALIPEHUTU fighter’s 
interpretation of the power structure of Burundi is the 
exact opposite: “the Tutsi” still hold the political power. 
He acknowledges that Hutu are present in the government 
and that a Hutu (Pierre Nkurunziza) is president. But he 
strongly doubts that “the Hutu” really have power since 
the most important positions are held by Tutsi. He refers to 
informal power in acknowledging that Hutu are present in 
the government, but asserting that they do not have power.
The next interviewee is a medical doctor in Bujumbura 
whose views about the power structures in Burundi are 
fairly close to those of the bashingantahe. Asked if there 
are also Tutsi in the present Burundian government, he 
responds:
Yes, that is because they want to demonstrate … in order to be 
accepted as political party, you need to meet a certain quota 
… that is all! They are obliged to proceed like this. But they do 
not have any power. They are told that they have to include a 
certain number of Tutsi … they are there, but they are never the 
president of the party, they do not have the big ministries. This 
is the problem. 
The doctor admits that there are Tutsi holding positions 
in the present political institutions but insists that they are 
only there in order to fulfil the ethnic quotas. According to 
him, Tutsi do not have any (informal) power, although he 
acknowledges their presence and representation. The refer-
ence to informal power echoes that of the FLN fighter (both 
interpret political power and, hence, exclusion in ethnic 
terms, and both refer to informal power in order to under-
pin their assessment), yet their interpretations of the power 
distribution are exactly opposite. These patterns of inter-
pretation appear in both countries. The following Rwandan 
interviewee is an NGO employee living in Butare. He has 
just been speaking about the privileged situation of “the 
Tutsi” and especially “the Tutsi from Uganda” when I ask 
him if the Hutu do not feel well represented at the political 
level. He answers:
I acknowledge that in the political, administrative system in 
Rwanda the Hutu occupy as many places as the others. But does 
it allow the people who are categorized in this category, Hutu I 
want to say, access in the same manner as the others? I do not 
think so, … besides there are certain persons who say that it 
is simply a representation, in fact, abstract. … It is there, but it 
cannot influence anything, cannot decide anything, simply in 
order to bluff.
The interviewee acknowledges the equal representation of 
Hutu in the administrative and political system but believes 
that formal representation does not necessarily guarantee 
representation of interests. According to him, formal power 
does not necessarily mean real informal power. In this re-
spect, he sees Hutu as unprivileged because their represen-
tation does not have any real impact: in terms of informal 
power they cannot influence anything. In this sense, Hutu 
are excluded. 
The next interviewee challenges these interpretations of 
informal power (exemplified by the quote of the NGO 
employee) as not corresponding to reality. He is a genocide 
survivor and priest living in Kigali. Asked about social 
cleavages in Rwanda he speaks about ethnic cleavages that 
the regime aims to overcome. Although the regime was 
making a real effort, “the Hutu” were not willing to ac-
knowledge it: 
But for the Hutu who lost, they say no, it is useless what you are 
doing, you will privilege your own. That is clear. They say it in 
the newspapers, in the print media, there are no places anymore 
for Hutu. In the government there are almost eleven … more 
than the majority of ministers are Hutu. … One does this  
13 I was not allowed to record, but 
took notes in German.
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explicitly to be able to say we are trying to overcome the ethnic 
cleavage. 
The interviewee explicitly accuses “the Hutu” of saying 
that they are excluded when they are not. He interprets the 
power configurations in ethnic terms: Since “the Hutu” 
lost power they say that they are politically not represented. 
Their assumption is that the government (presumably com-
posed of Tutsi) is going to benefit its own group (that is to 
say “the Tutsi”). The interviewee believes these accusations 
to be false since “the Hutu”’ make up more than the major-
ity in the government. Hence, he opposes his interpreta-
tion (referring to formal power) to an interpretation that 
assumes the distribution of informal power to be relevant. 
His specific interpretation of Rwandan power structures 
diverges from those quoted above. He does not believe “the 
Hutu” to be politically excluded, even though “they” claim 
to be. Two Burundian interviewees and one Rwandan 
stated that persons of one ethnic group hold merely formal 
political positions in order to show that all Rwandans (or 
Burundians) are integrated into the government. Thus, the 
power distribution and, hence, exclusion is interpreted in 
ethnic terms. These interviewees refer to informal power 
to underpin their argument. In contrast, the priest refers to 
formal power in order to contradict the ethnic interpreta-
tion of informal power. 
Although different political institutional models have been 
introduced in Rwanda and Burundi, similar ethnicised 
patterns of interpretation concerning the political and, 
consequently, social exclusion are found. The quotes imply 
contradictory interpretations of the power structures and 
the implied question “Which ‘ethnic group’ exactly is 
excluded?” The Rwandan regime is described as a Tutsi re-
gime in which “the Hutu” hold political positions but have 
no political power. This interpretation is opposed by one as-
serting that despite the political positions “the Hutu” hold, 
they insist on claiming that all political power lies with “the 
Tutsi”. Interpretations of formal and informal power struc-
tures and, thus, exclusion are even more contradictory in 
Burundi where “the Hutu” are described as puppets acting 
in the interest of “the Tutsi”, whereas, on the other hand, 
“the Tutsi” in the regime are believed to hold no power (oc-
cupying only formal positions).
4. Conclusion
The academic discussion considers exclusion (discrimina-
tion) to be a relevant aspect for explaining (violent) ethnic 
conflict. Ethnicised politics – widely assumed to entail eth-
nic conflict – are held to be induced by exclusion inherent to 
the structure of the political system (i.e. actors or institu-
tions). In contrast to the focus placed on the structures in-
herent to the political institutional systems, which predomi-
nates in the academic debate, the present article emphasises 
the taken-for-granted notions that constitute social reality. 
Accordingly, ethnicised politics are to be understood as 
political and social exclusion interpreted in terms of ethnic 
categories. And ethnicised politics constitute an important 
resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends 
(Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007, 8). 
Despite different political institutional models, formal and 
informal political power and, hence, exclusion are interpret-
ed in both countries in terms of ethnic categories of Hutu 
and Tutsi. Furthermore, the power distribution within the 
country and the answer to the question “Which ‘ethnic 
group’ is seen to be excluded?” is interpreted in diverg-
ing ethnic terms: “the Hutu” or “the Tutsi” are seen to be 
excluded. 
The present analysis does not, however, aim to analyse 
whether “the Hutu” or “the Tutsi” are oppositional or 
conform with their current governments in Rwanda and 
Burundi. Nor did I intend to discover whether the Rwandan 
or Burundian government is predominantly seen as Tutsi-
dominated or Hutu-dominated by its respective citizens. 
On the contrary, I intended to show that political and, thus, 
social in- and exclusion are self-evidently interpreted in 
terms of ethnic categories. In this sense, ethnicised politics 
are taken for granted.
Up to a point I agree that ethnicised politics entails violent 
ethnic conflict. But in a discussion that bases its arguments 
predominantly on the assumption that there are struc-
tures inherent to the political institutional model, I place 
emphasis on the knowledge of “those living in that world”. 
According to this argument, the intention to overcome eth-
nicised politics and, hence, ethnic (violent) conflict implies 
overcoming the patterns of interpretation of political and, 
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thus, social exclusion referring to ethnic categories. Follow-
ing the argument that reality is constituted by knowledge, 
which is constituted by taken-for-granted notions points 
to the necessity to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of 
these notions. Challenging this knowledge can be done by 
stressing on different (not ethnicised) patterns of interpre-
tation. In doing so, however, it is most crucial that these 
interpretations relate to the knowledge that “those living in 
that world” already have.
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